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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE J. ALLEN, for himself and all other
residents and taxpayers d ToJele C JU:1ty,
Utah, similarly situated,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

TOOELE COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Utah; GEORGE WILLIS SMITH,
GEORGE BUZIANIS and R. STERLING
HALLADAY, individually and as members
of the Board of Commissioners of Tocele
County; ENERGY LEASING SERVICES,
INC., a Delaware corporation; and THE
MAGNESIUM PROJECT, a jomt venture,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11297

APPELLANI''S BRIEF

I
I

I

I
I
I
I
I.

NATURE OF CASE
This is a class action for a declaratory judgment
determining questions of the construction and validity
of a state statute and actions taken by Tooele County
pursuant to authority contained in the statute.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The trial court, without a jury, held that the Utah
Industrial Facilities Development Act (Chapter 29
Laws of Utah 1967; Title 11, Chapter 17, Utah Code
Annotated 1953) is constitutional, valid and lawful;
and that certain agreements negotiated and made between the defendants, and revenue bonds to be issued
and sold by Tooele County, are lawful and enforceable
in all respects.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal and remand
to the District Court with directions to enter a judgment
declaring the Utah Industrial Facilities Development
Act to be unconstitutional and void, and actions taken
and being taken by the defendants to be unlawful.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Statute Involved
On March 9, 1967, the 37th Utah Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 187, known as the "Utah In·
dustrial Facilities Development Act," to become eff ective May 9, 1967, as Chapter 29, Laws of Utah 1967
(codified as Title 11, Chapter 17, Utah Code Annotated 1953) . The sections of the act are the same in
the session laws as in the code, i.e., Section 1 of Chapter
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29, Laws of Utah 1967, is codified as ll-17-1 Utah
Code Annotated 1953. Section 16, the last section of

the original act, is a garden variety savings clause that
does not appear as a section in the code.
Sections l and 2 of the act are devoted to identifying the act and defining terms used in it.
Section 3 confers upon municipalities and counties
the power to acquire and construct property suitable
for "manufacturing, warehousing, commercial or industrial purposes" other than public utilities; to lease projects for such rentals and upon such terms and conditions as the governing body deems advisable; to issue
revenue bonds for the purpose of financing the pro·
jects; and to grant options to renew leases and to purchase projects. The section prohibits a county or
municipality from itself operating any project, from
acquiring any part of a project by condemnation, and
from acquiring or leasing projects which would compete with telecommunication, electric and natural gas
utilities.
Section 4 describes the bonds as limited obligations
which shall not constitute a general obligation or liability, or a charge against the general credit or taxing
powers of, a municipality or county. The section contains additional provisions as to the form of the bonds,
interest, and registration, and permits inclusion in the
bonds of other provisions "deemed for the best interests
of" the issuer. The bonds may be sold at public or prirate sale "as may be determined by the governing body
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to be most advantageous," and the bonds are to be negotiable.
Under Section 5 the issuers are directed to secure
the bonds by "pledge and assignment of the revenues
out of which such bonds may be made payable," and
authorizes, in addition, a mortgage covering all or any
part of the project, a pledge and assignment of the
lease of such project, and "_such other security device
as may be deemed most advantageous by the governing
body issuing the bonds." The issuer is authorized to
include in the mortgage, among others, provisions related to fixing of rentals, terms to be incorporated in the
lease, maintenance and insurance, use of special funds
from the revenues of the projects, rights and remedies,
appointment of a receiver upon default in the payment
of principal and interest on the bonds, and foreclosure
of the mortgage. In this section it is again expressly
provided that breach of any agreement shall not impose
any general obligation or liability, or create a charge
upon the general credit or taxing powers of a municipality or county.
Under the provisions of Section 6 bonds may be
refunded in advance or by exchange of refunding bonds
to be issued under terms and conditions similar to those
provided in Sections 4 and 5.
Section 7 provides that the proceeds from the sale
of any bond shall be applied only for the purposes for
which the bonds were issued; that any accrued interest
and premium received may be applied to the payment
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of principal or interest; and that proceeds not needed
for the project are to be applied toward payment of
principal or interest on the bonds.
The "cost of acquiring or improving any project"
is defined by Section 8 to include cost of acquisition or
improvement of real estate, cost of enlarging, construction, reconstructing, improving, maintaining, equipping, or furnishing the project, including architect or
engineer's fees, and expenses in connection with authorization, sale and issuance of the bonds, legal fees, financial advisors' fees, printing costs, and the interest
on such bonds during construction, and for a reasonable
period of time before and after construction.
Section 9 prohibits the municipality or county from
commingling bond proceeds, project revenues, and interest, with any other funds of the county or municipality.
Section 10 declares that property acquired or held
by the county or municipality under the act is "public
property used for essential public and governmental
purposes," and the property, the bonds issued under the
act, and the income from them are exempted from taxes
imposed by the state, county, municipality, or any other
political subdivision in the state. There is an additional
provision that the exemption shall not extend to "the
interests" of the private persons, which shall be subject
to the provisions of 59-13-73 Utah Code Annotated
1953, or other applicable law. The private entities are
not exempted from taxation of income from the projects.
5

Section 11 contains a prov1s10n that the act shall
not be be construed as limiting other powers that a
county or municipality may already have.
provides thai the bonds are to be legal
securities that may properly be purchased by puLlie
officers and public bodies of the state and its political '
subdivisions; and that may properly and legally be deposited with and received by any state or municipal
officer for any purpose for which the deposit of bonds
or obligations of the state is now or may hereafter be
authorized by law.
~ection 12

Under the provisions of Section 13 the legislature
agrees that the state will not hereafter alter, impair or
limit the rights until the bonds, together with interest,
are met and discharged and the contracts are fully performed, but that such alteration or impairment may be ~
accomplished if provision is made for protection of the
bond holders or persons entering into contracts with a ,
county or municipality. The counties and municipalities
are authorized to include the legislative pledge in bonds
and contracts issued and entered into pursuant to the
statute.
Section 14 exempts the bonds from provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
Section 15 exempts the bonds and projects from
competitive bidding provisions otherwise applicable to
sales and purchases of property, construction contracts.
and sales and purchase of bonds.
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The Planned Project
After the Utah Industrial Development Facilities
Act was passed by the Legislature the Tooele County
Commissioners decided to use the act for development
of private industry within the county (Tr. 10). No
formal investigation or hearing was undertaken by the
county before the decision was made, though some inquiries were made by the Commissioners (Tr. 10). The
inquiries disclosed some facts that would tend to negative the desirability of the proposed project. Commissioner R. Sterling IIalladay testified that there is a low
unemployment rate in Tooele County; housing is of
doubtful availability; Grantsville does not have adequate sewage disposal facilities; and there is serious
question as to the availability of school rooms. No
methodical investigation was made to determine the
effect of the bond issue on future bonding capacity for
public improvements (Tr. 10-13). It was thought that
diversification of industry is desirable (Tr. 20).
The County Commissioners did not meet with any
group other than The Magnesium Project to discuss
use of the act to develop private industry in Tooele
County (Tr. 10).
Since about the effective date of the act negotiations have been going on between The Magnesium Project and Tooele County with respect to issuance of
County bonds for the financing, acquisition, and construction of an electrolytic minerals extraction plant
near Great Salt Lake, at an estimated cost of
~.5:!,000,000.
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Tooele County is neither populous nor wealthy.
In 1960 the population was 17 ,868 and there has been
no marked growth since. In 1967 the total assessed
valuation of property within the county was $28,122,·
264.00, upon which taxes in the amount of $1,925,078.30
were levied and approximately $1,900,000.00 collected
(Ex. P-1). It is expected that the assessed valuation
for 1968 will be somewhat less than $30,000,000.00, and
total taxes about $2,000,000.00 (Tr. 14, 18).
The Magnesium Project is a joint venture the
interests in which are owned approximately 20% by
H-K, Inc., a Utah corporation, and 80% by National
Lead Company, a New Jersey corporation (Tr. 24).
The financial condition of H-K, Inc., was not shown,
but National Lead Company is a well-to-do corpora·
tion capable of obtaining it_s own financing. In 1967
the assets of the company were valued at more than
$57 5,000,000, and income before taxes was almost
$95,000,000 (Ex. D-8).
The ability to obtain financing for projects such
as that planned for Great Salt Lake is dependent upon
the underlying financial strength of the operators of the
project, and bonds issued for development of the elec·
trolytic extraction plant, to be readily marketable,
would have to be guarantied by one or more of the
members of the joint venture (Tr. 34). Although the
company could arrange its own financing, it desires
to use bonds issued by Tooele County because it is
anticipated that the income from the bonds will be
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exempt from taxation by the United States and the
State. Tax-exempt bonds customarily are purchased at
lower rates of interest than bonds that are not exempt
(Tr.40).

Possible availability of tax-exempt bonding, however, is not the sole (and probably not the primary)
motivation for location of the project in Tooele County.
The Great Salt Lake is one of the world's best sources
of magnesium and lithium; and the Tooele County site
is strategically located with respect to ponding areas
and railheads (Tr. 37-38) .
Although not all of the agreements between Tooele
County and The Magnesium Project have been executed, two of them have; the others have been reduced
to writing and agreement reached on substantially all
of the material terms and conditions to be contained
in them.
On March 14, 1968, Tooele County entered into
a letter agreement (Ex. P-3) with Goodbody & Co.,
a securities dealer, under which the company agreed to
accept delivery of and pay for not more than $60,000,000
of bonds at a purchase price of $975 per $1,000 principal amount, plus accrued interest, and at a coupon rate
of 5% per cent, subject to certain conditions.
On March 18, 1968, an agreement (Ex. P-2) was
executed by The Magnesium Project and Tooele
County under which the county agreed to make a search
for and survey of, and to obtain options on property to
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be used for the project; also to investigate availability
and prepare a report of possible water sources and highway locations, and conduct a survey of the labor force.
To accomplish this the county agreed to utilize its offi.
cers, agents, and employees, and allocate necessary
funds. The company agreed to make studies as to the
"feasibility" of carrying out an electrolytic minerals :
extraction operation at the proposed site, and to notify
the county whether it would enter into a lease with the
county.
1

Both of the above agreements referred to a "Lease
and Agreement" and a "lVIortgage and Indenture of
Trust," which are to be the governing documents. The
lease and indenture both have been worked over in considerable detail and it is apparent that the county and
The Magnesium Project are in substantial agreement
on the terms to be included in them (Tr. 32-33) . The
lease consists of 46 pages, and the mortgage and indenture of trust consists of approximately 70 pages of
printed material.
Although the agreement of March 18, 1968, referred to "feasibility" studies to be made by the company, testimony at the trial indicated that the feasibility
had been dependent primarily upon the company's
being able to obtain electric energy at a rate it regarded
as being· 1ow enough to permit economical operation of
the project. At the trial there was testimony that the
company and Utah Power & Light Company, supplier
of electrical energy, had substantially agreed upon all
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of the terms of an electrical supply contract and that
execution of a contract was imminent (Tr. 37). Since
the trial, newspaper reports indicate that a contract has
in fact been signed by Utah Power & Light Company
and The Magnesium Project. It thus appears that the
county has executed contracts under which it is obligated to spend county money and use county personnel
in aid of The Magnesium Project. In addition, the
parties have progressed so far in their negotiations on
the lease, mortgage, and indenture of trust that it may
fairly be said that an agreement has been reached,
whether or not is has been signed. There is a genuine
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendants
concerning the validity of the statute, the lease, and the
bonds, as well as the agreements incidental to them.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

The act is unconstitutional because it authorizes
lending of credit in aid of private enterprises.
Article VI, Section 31, Utah Constitution, provides:
"The legislature shall not authorize the State,
or any county, city, town, township, district or
other political subdivision of the State to lend its
credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any
railroad, telegraph or other private individual or
corporate enterprise or undertaking."
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Proponents of public bonding for the purpose of
encouraging industry (defendants among them) have
consistently argued that such constitutional provisions
do not apply to industrial development bonds for the
following reasons: ( 1) inasmuch as the development of
private industry aids the general economy, the bonds
are for a public purpose, not a "private individual or ,
corporate enterprise or undertaking;" and ( 2) inasmuch
as the bonds are not charges against the general revenues of a municipality or county, there is no "lending
of credit."
The argument that the bonds are not in aid of private enterprise should have been laid at rest during
Utah's constitutional convention. Article VI, Section
31 did not sneak into the constitution. The Report of
Proceedings of the Utah Constitutional Convention
contains lengthy debates about the desirability of such
an article. Those opposed to the section argued that the
territory's credit was needed to "build up industry, the
prosperity and resources of the territory" (Page 909) ·
The section in question was proposed by l\'Ir. Varian
whose comments included the following:
"The purpose of my section is to prohibit the
lending of credit in any way for the furtherance
of such enterprises as are indicated (Page 952)
* * * It is a solemn duty, sir, that we have. to
guard the public revenue and the public property
from spoilation. We may not farm it out through
future generations to be disposed of for other '·
than the necessary purposes of ,government. You
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have it in your power to put into this organic
law a statement which shall be in accord with
the prevailing public and financial interests
everywhere, that no public body, either state nor
county, city nor township, nor district, shall ever
burden the people's property, shall ever encumber the people's revenues, with an indebtedness
designed to aid other than public institutions
(Page 1001) ." [Emphasis added.}
Another of the proponents, Mr. Richards, at Page
913 of the proceedings quoted Cooley, the renowned constitutional lawyer, as follows:
"It has been well and forcibly said that individuals and corporations embark in manufactories for the purpose of personal and corporate
gain. Their purposes and objects are precisely
the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic,
or the day laborer. They engage in the selected
branch of manufactories for the purpose and
with the hope and expectation not of loss, but of
profits. The general benefit of the community
resulting from every description of well regulated labor is of the same character, whatever may
be the branch of industry upon which it may be
expended. All useful labors, no matter what the
field of labor, serve the state by increasing the
aggregate of its profits, its wealth. There is nothing of a public nature."

The arguments for some form of public aid to private industry are the same today as when the constitution was being considered and adopted. 'fhey are variations of the latter-day 'Vilson's ingenuous remark:
"'Vhat's good for General Motors is good for the
, eountry."

13

An incidental public benefit resulting from the
creation and success of a private enterprise does not
remove that enterprise from the "private" category and
convert it into a "public institution."
A modern day recognition of the difference between "private" and "public" purposes is found in State
v. Town of North ft;Jiami, 59 So.2d 779, (Fla., 1952),
wherein the Supreme Court of Florida said:
"Every new business, manufacturing plant, or
industrial plant which may be established in a
municipality will be of some benefit to the municipality. A new super market, a new department
store, a new meat market, a steel mill, a crate
manufacturing plant, a pulp mill, or other establishments which could be named without end,
may be of material benefit to the growth, progress, development and prosperity of a municipality. But these considerations do not make
the acquisition of land and the erection of buildings, for such purposes, a municipal purpose."
The "lending of credit" argument must also fail.
The quoted proceedings of the constitutional convention
show that Section 31 was meant to prohibit the lending
of credit "in any form," not only to protect the tax
revenues but also the properties of the state and its sub·
divisions. Admittedly, some other courts have considered
similar constitutional provisions and have held that if
the general taxing power is not obligated for repayment
of the bonds, there is no "lending of credit." But this
court has itself recognized that "credit" involves factors
other than the source from which the funds are to he
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repaid. As stated in Wadsworth v. Santaquin City,
83 Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161, 169 ( 1933) a case involving
"revenue" bonds, the court said:
"Nevertheless, the bonds must be paid when
due, or city credit will be impaired. With noiseless foot and steady tread the day of reckoning
inevitably comes to demand its toll. To a city,
no less than to a state or individual, untarnished
credit and an honored name are of inestimable
worth. No wealth or power which may come to
a community is of more lasting importance than
the good name it maintains by keeping its faith
unbroken by meeting all of its engagements and
obligations. In spite of the fact that full faith
and credit of a city is not pledged to payment of
the revenue bonds, no prudent c1ty will permit
its promise to pay to go unfulfilled where it has
received and enjoyed the fruits of the obligation."
In State v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 197 N.E.2d 328,
(1964), a case involving industrial development revenue
bonds, the court said:
"The sale of revenue bonds of the state to raise
money necessarily involves a borrowing of money
even though no indebtedness of the state results.
If the bonds are not paid, the borrowing power
of the state will as a result be adversely affected,
even though the bonds do not represent a debt
of the state. The borrowing power of the state
is related to the taxing power because, to the
extent that the state's borrowing power is lessenburden will be placed upon its taxed,
. a greater
,,
mg power.
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The Ohio court recognized what has long been
recognized in financial circles, that the interest rate
payable on bonds is determined in large measure by '
competition among bond sellers. If tax free bonds are
multiplied, the interest payable by municipalities and
counties on other tax free bonds likely will be increased.
The result is that municipalities, cities, and counties
may have to pay higher rates of interest on "legitimate"
bonds issued to finance public improvements.

!

Increased interest and decreased borrowing power
are not the only elements suggesting a "lending of
credit" contrary to Section 31. The act is broad enough
to permit a municipality or county to secure revenue
bonds by pledge of income from property not acquired
with bond proceeds. Section 3 (I) permits acquisition
by devise, gift, or exchange, as well as by purchase ,
from bond revenues. By other provisions of Section 3,
a project may be constructed on property "owned" by
the municipality or county and the project may then
be leased to any person, firm, partnership or corporation for the operation of a private project.
Moreover, Section 3 permits municipalities and
counties to use their funds and their efforts, apart from
bond proceeds, in aid of private enterprise, and to asswne
legal and financial obligations in connection with development of a project. Indeed, the contract between
Tooele County and The Magnesium Project (Ex.
P-2) places a burden upon the county to acquire options
and to make surveys and investigations of sites, labor
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markets, and so forth. These additional burdens have
been recognized as being aids to private enterprise
which are prohibited by constitutional provisions similar
to Utah's.
In State v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d
269 ( 1957), the court held that a statute permitting
cities to issue industrial development revenue bonds
violated a constitutional provision against giving or
lending of credit of the state, saying:

"It is true that the revenue bonds are not a
general liability of the city and they ~re not subject to payment through the exercise of the taxing
power. But they do cast burdens upon a city
with reference to their issuance and payment.
The city and its officers are charged with the
duty of fixing and collecting the rentals from
which the revenue bonds are to be paid. This
necessitates the execution of leases, the fixing of
rentals, the taking of chattel mortgages on equipment to secure payment of rent, the providing
of insurance coverage, and the determination of
payments to be made in lieu of taxes. It imposes
duties and responsibilities upon the city and its
officers on matters which are private rather than
public in character. The issuance of the bonds
in the name of the city for the payment of the
cost of the project evidences the fact that the
credit of the city has been extended. The city is
the payer of the bonds and it is primarily liable
for their payment. The bonds become the obligations of the city. The fact that the means of
payment is limited does not make it any less so.
A failure of payment is a default by the city.
The constitutional prohibition does not infer that
17

the credit of the State or its political subdivisions
may be given or loaned except when a general
liability exists. The prohibition clearly provides
that the credit of a state may not be given or
loaned to an individual, association, or corporation under any circumstances. * * * It seems clear
to us that the revenue bonds are issued by the
city in its own name to give them a marketability
and value which they would otherwise not possess. If their issuance by a city is an inducement
to industry, some benefits must be conferred, or
it would be no inducement at all. Such benefits,
whatever form they may take, necessarily must
be based on the credit of the city. The loan of
its name by a city to bring about a benefit to a
private object, even though general liability does
not exist, is nothing short of a loan of its credit."
In the present case, testimony of an officer of The
l\1agnesium Project substantiates that the name of the
county, its credit, is important in connection with the
borrowing-important because it leads to a tax exemption on the bonds; important because tax exemption
results in a lower interest rate.
In 1959 Idaho enacted an industrial development
act very like Utah's. The act was held unconstitutional
by that state's Supreme Court in Village of Moyie
Springs, Idaho, et al. v. Aurora Manufacturing Co.,
82 Idaho 337, 353 P .2d 767 ( 1967) , in a lengthy
opinion in which the court considered all of the customary arguments. With respect to "lending of credit"
it said:
"It is obvious that one of the prime purposes
of having the necessary bonds issued by it in the

18

!

name of the municipality is to make them more
readily salable on the market. Thus the credit
of the municipality is extended in aid of the project, regardless of the limitations placed upon
the remedy of the purchaser * * *"
The court was not swayed by decision_s of other
jurisdictions upholding industrial development revenue
acts, observing that the decisions "read like apologies
to constitutional limitations, dictated by expediency."
The contemplation of the Utah Industrial Facilities
Development Act is that the municipalities and counties will issue their bonds for the acquisition and construction of projects to be operated by private enterprise, and that they may not operate the projects
themselves. It was recognized in State v. Town of
North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, Fla., (1952)
that as
soon as the bonds are sold by the municipality, the
moneys received become public moneys and their use
for the construction of a project to be operated by
private enterprise is, in essence, the use of public moneys
for private purpose prohibited by organic law.
Not content with permitting municipalities and
counties to lend their credit for development of projects
in which they are interested, the legislature has empowered all public bodies to lend their credit. Section
12 makes such bonds "securities in which all public
officers and public bodies of the state and its political
subdivisions may invest." An "investment" in such bonds
~call it what you will-is a lending of credit to the
enterprise; and if the bonds are purchased by the State
19

there would be a violation of Article XIV, Section 6
'
which provides that "the State shall not assume the
debt, or any part thereof, of any county, city, town,
or school district."
In arguing that industrial development bonds are
for a valid public purpose, proponents assert that the
economy generally will be benefited, and some evidence
to that effect has been introduced in this case. But
showing of a public benefit in the instant case (if one
is shown) does not save the act because the act itself
requires neither benefit nor purpose. The state has not
established any standards as to what is or is not a public
purpose, and it cannot be assumed that private indus·
trial development, per se, i_s one. The act does not
require, and in this instance the county did not make,
any findings with respect to the total impact of the
project upon county government. As pointed out in
M. M. Smith et al., v. State of Georgia et al., 222 Ga.
552, 150 S.E. 2d 868, 871:

"* * * appellants emphasize that this amend·
ment does not limit the activities of the county
in furnishing facilities to private enterprise sole·
ly on those occasions to relieve unemployment,
or for any other public purpose, with which co~·
clusion we agree. This amendment would permit
the county to issue bonds for a purely private
purpose; for example to secure funds to con·
struct a building or plant to be leased to and
occupied by an already existing and operat!ng
business with a perfectly adequate buildmg
which would perform the same functions, em·
ploy the same number of people, and add nothing
20

in the way of industry, or alleviate unemployment, or otherwise contribute to the public good.
* * * This amendment does not, as appellees
argue, provide for the promotion and development of new industry in the county. New industry might be developed, but there is nothing
in the act which requires that the funds be used
for development of new industry, or to relieve
unemployment or to provide new jobs so that its
citizens may be furnished employment and not
be forced to leave the county to find employment,
or for any other public purpose."
Finally, Article VI, Section 31 is violated by
Section 3 ( 4) of the act under which counties or municipalities may grant to the lessee of any project an option
to purchase the project or to renew any lease for a
nominal sum. It is easy to see a situation in which the
county has become the owner of a property of substantial value. I ts opportunity to sell the property without
any safeguards as to price or bidding, or to lease the
property for a nominal sum, is tantamount to making
a gift to a private enterprise, at least insofar as the
fair rental value of the property exceeds the rent reserved, or the fair market value exceeds the purchase
price in the option.

II

The act is unconstitutional because it permits municipalities and counties to grant privileges or immunities to private companies.
21

Article I, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution pro·
vides:
"No law shall be passed granting irrevocablv .
any franchise, privilege, or immunity."
·
Inasmuch as the legislation permits municipalities
and counties to grant to private enterprises the right :
to use public property for long periods of time there
seems to be little question that the act permits the •
granting of privileges or immunities by municipalities
and counties. These terms have been interpreted with
some breadth by the court. See Thomas v. Daughters
of the Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477.
I

We recognize, however, that most of the decisions
applying Article I, Section 23, have been concerned
with the question of whether a privilege or immunity
granted by the state or one of its political subdivisions i
has been granted "irrevocably." In Section 13 of the ,
act there is a provision that the State of Utah agrees
with the holder of any bonds issued under the act that
the state "will not alter, impair or limit the rights thereby
vested until the bonds, together with applicable interest
are fully met and discharged and such contracts are
fully performed." Unquestionably such provision binds
the hands of future legislatures and violates Section 23.
1

III

The act constitutes special legi8lation, not of uniform operation, and constitutes an unlawful delegation
of legislaitve power.
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The act as written runs counter to three constitutional provisions which overlap in some degree and
should be considered together. Article VI, Section 26
of the Utah Constitution provides:
"The legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or special laws in the following cases:
. . . 16. Granting to an individual, association
or corportaion any privilege, immunity or franchise ... "
Article I, Section 24:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
Article VI, Section I:
"The legislative power of the state shall be
vested:
"I. In a senate and house of representatives

which shall be designated the legislature of the
State of Utah.
"2. The people of the State of Utah as hereinafter stated . . "

In addition, Article V, Section I, provides for a
~eparation of powers as between the legislative, executive, and judicial.
The above sections should be considered together,
because the act, taken as a whole, includes some classitications which are unreasonable, fails to set out legislati\'e standards for the determination of the need for
''projects" and, by grants of power to counties, permits
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them to proceed through "special legislation" toward
a development of industry they deem desirable.
The concept of "special legislation" has been before
this court in a number of cases. In Allen v. 1'rueman,,
100 Utah 36, 110 P.2d 355 (1941), a statute allowing
owners of trademarks and trade names to invoke crimi- i
nal procedure of search and seizure to protect civil ·
rights was held to have granted a special privilege and
was therefore invalid under subdivision 16 of Article
VI, Section 26. An act allowing 70% of the barbers
in an area to fix prices and hours was held invalid on
similar grounds in Revne v. Trade Commission, 113
Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563 ( 1948). See also Justice v.
Standard Gilsonite Company, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d
97 4 ( 1961) , wherein a provision of the Industrial Corn·
mission Act requiring payment of wages to separated
employees within 24 hours after separation violated
Section 26 for the reason that it excluded banks and
mercantile houses without any justification for such ,
exclusion. In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 ~tab I
2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 ( 1962), the Civic Auditonum
Act was held to have violated Section 26 because it 1
applied only to cities of a population of 250,000 or over. I
1

1

1

The need for uniformity of legislation has been
recognized in other cases. In Orem City v. Payne, lo
Utah 2d 355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965) and Roe v. Sall
Lake City, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 437 P.2d 195, legislation
has been held to be unconstitutional because of classi· .
fications and exclusions which had no apparent justi·
1

fication.
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The Utah Industrial Facilities Development Act
is offensive to these various constitutional provisions
for a number of reasons. In the first place, the act
contains some express exclusions, without a reasonable
distinguishing basis.

Section 3 of the act prohibits municipalities and
counties from financing projects "for telecorrununication facilities, the generation, transmission, or distribution of eletcric energy beyond the project site or the
production, transmission, or distribution of natural
gas." There is no apparent reason why industry generally should be subjected to the competition engendered
by participation of municipalities and counties in private
enterprise, while those listed in Section 3 are not. The
exclusion cannot be justified on the ground that these
businesses are regulated utilities, since other regulated
utilities are not excluded and might take advantage of
the act. The act also amounts to special legislation in
that it exempts these particular bonds from provisions
I I
\ of the Uniform Commercial Code and exempts the
1
bonds and construction from public laws placing upon
1\
municipalities and counties the burden of requiring
. I
· I competitive public bidding.

nl

11

1

• .

i·

Implicit in the special legislation concept is a
matter involved with the practical application of the
statute, which in turn is concerned with the delegation
of legislative power without proper standards. It is
:1pparent that a county or municipality seeking to use
1hr act is not required to make any particular findings
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about public purpose or public benefit. It is free to
negotiate with whomever it wishes-whenever it wisheb
-and to arrive, in a substantially unfettered discretion.
at such provisions for leases, bonds, repayments, optiorn
to renew leases, and so forth, as it sees fit. There is no
provision in the act authorizing private industries to
apply for the treatment or setting any standards by
which the county or municipality can determine to •
whom the benefits of the act will be extended. As i!
is doubtful that any county or municipality could keep
on heaping bond issue upon bond issue, only those for
who are able to move quickly will be able to take advan·
tage of the act.
The county, because of the void spaces in the act
is free to operate in the following areas: the fixing of
interest; minimum prices at which bonds may be sold;
extension of projects beyond the boundaries of the
county without limitation as to distance; agreement to
use other security devices without limitation; amount
of rentals to be obtained (since the act does not even
require that rentals be sufficient to pay principal and
interest on the bonds.)

IV
The act would allow municipalities and counties
to contravene constitutional debt limit pro·cisions and
for that rea.Yon i.s invalid.

Article XIY, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
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"No debt in excess of the taxes for the current
year shall be created by any county or subdivision thereof, * * * or by any city, town or
village or any subdivision thereof in this State;
w1less the proposition to create such debt, shall
have been submitted to a vote of such qualified
electors as shall have paid a property tax therein,
in the year preceding such election, and a majority of those voting thereon shall have voted
in favor of incurring such debt."
Article XIV, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
"When authorized to create indebtedness as
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county
shall become indebted to an amount, including
existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum
of the value of the taxable property therein
* * * no part of the indebtedness allowed in this
section shall be incurred for other than strictly
county, city, town or school district purposes

* * *"

' Both of these provisions will be violated by the proposed financing. Respondents have argued that the
financing will fall within the "special fund" doctrine
enunciated in earlier Utah cases and hence there is no
riolation of Sections 3 and 4. The act, however, goes
much further than the proceedings involved in those
cases. The court has, in fact, recognized that the special
fund doctrine is not applicable where the bonds are
Payable out of the ~evenues of both an existing and an
expanded system. See F jeldsted v. Ogden City, 83
Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933) and Wadsworth v. Sanla711in City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933). The
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legislature in enacting the so-called Granger Act als 0
recognized the limitation when it provided for allocation of revenues attributable to previously existing
facilities separately from those attributable to any pro.;
posed improvements or additions to such facilifo.
From the evidence adduced at the trial, there can be
no doubt that the amounts involved are far greater than·
would be allowed by Sections 2 and 3. The total amounl
of bonds to be issued far exceeds two per cent of the
assessed valuation of Tooele County. It would, in fad,
be double the total valuation. Moreover, the act does
not preclude a municipality or county from constructing
projects on property already owned by them, purchased
by them with public funds, acquired by exchange, or
given to them. Inasmuch as the bonds may be secured
in part by a f oreclosable mortgage on the project, it is
entirely possible that property other than that acquireo
with bond revenues would be charged with the deLt,
and the municipality or county would lose property it
already had. Thus it cannot logically be argued that
indebtedness of the municipality or county will not be
created, or that the proceedings come strictly within
the special fund doctrine.

1

v

The act is unconstitidional because it grants for· I
bidden tax exemptions and allows unexempt tangi/Jfr I
property in the state to escape taxation.
i
Sections 2, 3, and 10 of Article XIII of the Utali'
Constitution all insist upon equality of taxation in thii'
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state. Certain exemptions are provided by Section 2
but none of them is involved in this case. It provides:

"All tangible property in this state not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to
its value * * *"
Section 3 provides in part that:

11.

I

i

"The legislature shall provide by law a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all
tangible property in this State, according to its
value in money."
Section IO provides:

"All corporations or persons in this State, or
doing business herein, shall be subject to taxation
for State, County, School, Municipal, or other
purposes, on the real and personal property
owned or used by them within the Territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax."
The scheme of Section 2 is that all tangible property
it
in the state not specifically exempted by the constitun tion (or the laws of the United States) shall be taxed
equally and fully. No exemption is provided under
the constitution for industrial plants. The fact that the
i··
pbnts or projects will technically be owned by the munil I :1pality or county should be of no moment, for a~ stated
.t
in the dissenting opinion in Village of Demming v.
I llosdreg, 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 ( 1956) "The feah. ture of municipal ownership is a sham." The real owner
11
Will he the private business entity.

I
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Section 10 of the act exempts from taxation all I
property acquired or held by that county or munici. ;
pality under the act and such property together witl1 i
the bonds and the income from them are exempt from '.
all taxes imposed by the State of Utah or any of its
political subdivisions. It then allows a three-prong
exemption-each resulting in discrimination. While the
section does provide that the "interests" of any private
person or firm are not exempt and makes such "interests" subject to the provisions of Section 59-13-73
Utah Code Annotated 1953 the legislature must have
intended to grant an exemption not theretofore be·
stowed, and it would seem that the tax on such proper!)'
would be less than if it were owned outright by the
private business entity. Otherwise there would hare
been no need for the exclusionary language of Section I
10 of th: act. If ~ecti~n 59-13-73. were intended to I
apply without qualification, the legislature need only
have said so. Then the tax would have been the same
as "if the possessor or user were the owner thereof." 1
The same thing would apply under Section 3. If, a~
the act provides, the property of the project is exempt
from all taxation and only the "interests" of the private
business entity is taxed, likely there will not be a
uniform and equal rate of taxation on the property
according to its value in money. There is nothing in
the act to define the term "interests" or to indicate
how it is to be determined. Thus, each individual asssesor 1
1
will be left the choice of applying the section according
to his understanding of the term.
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This court has, on several occasions repudiated
legislation because it conflicted with one or more of the
aboYe constitutional provisions. For example, in Foulger v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 165, 397 P.2d
298, the court, with little discussion, held that Freeport
Legislation was unconstitutional and the tax exemption
granted by the legislation was invalid by reason of said
sections. See also Duchesne City v. State Tax Commission, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 and Moon Lake Electrical Association v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d
384, 345 P.2d 612. In the latter case, an act which limited
the ad valorem tax on electrical cooperatives to $50
times the miles of line of the cooperative was held invalid
1e
for the reason that it conflicted with Sections 2 and 3.
The court noted that under those sections, the tax must
111
be based on the cash value of the properties held, and
:: I that the desirability of the legislation was immaterial.

;e I
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"All taxes, whether state, local or municipal,
shall be uniform for the same class of subjects
within the same territorial limits of the authority
levying the tax."

ty
in

The court said :

tie

nu·
~

155 S.E.2d 326 (Va., 1967) a somewhat similar act was

held unconstitutional on the basis it conflicted with a
constitutional provision that:

a~

:or

In Industrial Development Authority v. Southers,

I

i

"The idea of taxation imports equality of apportionment * * * it is this which distinguishes
taxation from arbitrary exaction* **exemption
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of the property of one person casts an inequitablt
burden on others not thus graciously favored .•
VI

The act violates various other provisions of t/11
Utah and Federal Constitutions and cannot be upheld
The most apparent constitutional objections to tlit
act have been brought to the court's attention. Yet.
there are others, which to no lesser degree require invali·
dation of the act and the proceedings taken under it.
Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Constitution
prohibits the legislature from delegating "to any special
commission, private corporation or association, an}
power to make, supervise or interfere with any munic·
ipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether
held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a
capitol site, or to perform any municipal functions.'·
Inasmuch as the private corporation would operate
property of the county or municipality it cannot be i
gainsaid that it would not only be supervising ana
interfering with a municipal improvement and property.
but also that it in effect would be performing a munici· \
pal function. Moreover, the act allows upon default, a
trustee or receiver to take charge of the property witli 1
power to charge and collect rents, and apply the rere·
nues. He would have custody of and disburse public I
funds, and would otherwise control and manage public I
property and revenues - in violation of the abW.
sections.
1

32

Several decisions of this court invalidating legislad • tion under Section 29 are County Water System v. Salt
Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285; Barnes v. Lehi
City, 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878; and Logan City v.
Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961.
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t/11

Article I, Section 24 Utah Constitution provides:

M

tlit
'et.

"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

a]i.

As stated under Point II, the act allows municipalities to issue bonds to finance certain industrial proion
jects but specifically excludes others without any justi~ial
fiable reason. For that reason, as well as the fact that
tll)'
only a favored few will, as a practical matter, be able
1ic·
tu take advantage of the act, it is violative of Section 24.
her
There is nothing in the act which authorizes private
ta in dustry to apply for its benefits or sets any standards
15
'
by which the county or municipality can determine to
·ate
whom such benefits will be accorded. Thus they can
be i
pick and choose to whom they will grant favorable
1110
treatment.
it.

The act also runs counter to Article VI, Section 5,
Utah Constitution which sets forth the powers that the
legislature may validly confer upon municipalities. There
is nothing in Section 5 which would authorize them to
finance projects for private business enterprise or issue
blk I bouds payable for revenues derived from property not
1W constituting public utilities, particularly when secured
by foreclosable mortgages on such property. Section 5

iici· \
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was held to have required invalidation of legislation iu '.
Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra., dealing with tt1e,
Civic Auditorium and Sports Arena Act of 1961 a111 !
in Nance v. Mayflower Taverns, Inc., 106 Utah 517,·
150 P.2d 773. In the latter case the court stated.
i
J

s1
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ti
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tJ

"The constitution, Article VI, Section 5 grants'
to cities forming charters pursuant to the pro·
cedures outlined in Section 5 of Article XI the
power to exercise 'all powers relating to mwii·
cipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within
its limit, local police, sanitary and similar regu·
lation which does not conflict with the general
law * * *

1

f1

h

ci

a
o
ti

"Neither the statute nor the constitution
authorizes municipalities to legislate in regard P
p
to civil rights.,"
There is nothing in the constitution which author·
izes municipalities to have the powers conferred by the 1
act and it cannot therefore be sustained.
i

\'

I

t

''All moneys borrowed by, or on behalf of the
State or any legal subdivision thereof, shall be I
used solely for the purpose specified in the ]a\\
authorizing the loan."

1

Another provision which is violated by the act ano \
the proposed proceedings thereunder is Article XIV. I f
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution which provides that:

In Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2(11
591 this court held that restrictive provisions in con·,
struction contracts let by Salt Lake City which increase(! '
the cost of such project without enhancing its value con·\
34

I

stituted a pro-tanto diversion of funds and hence violated Section 5. The same type of situation prevails in
this case. Section 15 of the act renders inapplicable to
projects financed thereunder any laws or regulations
, purporting to require the letting of construction contracts by advertisement and public competitive bidding.
This makes it possible for public funds to be diverted
from their intended purpose because of unnecessarily
high construction costs caused by negotiated rather than
competitive letting of contracts. Also, Section 3 includes
a great number of things which are "deemed" to be part
of the costs of acquiring or improving a project. Although some of them may be necessary for such purposes, others would not enhance the value of any
projects and would constitute an unconstitutional diYersion of funds.
The act also violates Article I, Section 2, of the
Ptah Constitution, and the 5th and 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution, in that it would deprive plaintiff of his property without due process of
law for the reason that it involves an inequality of taxation, and grants tax exemptions to some persons that
will not be available to others and is discriminatory.
Plaintiff, as a taxpayer of Tooele County will suffer
loss if there should be a failure on the part of the county
to recoup all the money it has expended.
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VII

The portion of the act authorizing investrnent u:i
the state, its political subdivisions and others in bond
issued under the act is unconstitutional, is not severault
from the rest of the act, and renders it invalid.

1

The respondents have argued and the trial court
agreed that Section 12 of the act, which authorize~,
the ,state, its political subdivisions and all public bodies;
thereof, as well as banks, trustees and other fiduciaried
I
to purchase said bonds, is not involved in this present
case inasmuch as Tooele County has indicated that i1
does not intend to invest therein. This doe_s not meari,
however, that the state or other political subdivisions
will not do so. And unless the section is 'patently severable from the rest of the act, the question is not so mucli
what will be done as what can be done under it. A~
stated in Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 136, no P.2u
355 (1941) "We are concerned not so much with whal1
was done under the act and the facts presented by thi1\
case, as with what it authorized to be done * * *"
'
Section 12 seems to be an integral part of the act
It is designed to aid the marketability of the bonds and
certainly without such help, the act will lose much o! I
its efficacy. Thus, the court could not say that without
such provision the act would nevertheless have beeu I
passed. And if the state or one of its political subdiri· I
sions purchase the bonds and default occurs, they wi~ I
suffer the loss. In a very real sense, they will haitl
assumed an obligation of the county or municipality int
contravention of the constitution.
36
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CONCLUSION

In this case the plaintiff challenges the validity
nd.i of action taken and being taken by Tooele County in
iult the negotiation
· · an d execution of agreements re1ating to
' the sale of revenue bonds, execution of mortgages, and
JUrl entry into a lease with an option to purchase. But the
ize~: inquiry must not be limited to the question of whether
dies1 Tooele County, under properly enacted enabling legissied1 lation, might proceed as they have proceeded in encourient ing the advent of new industry into the county. A
:t i1 necessary pre-requisite for any action by the county
ear1, with regard to the issuance of revenue bonds, the acquiioru sition and construction of projects, and the leasing of
ver· such projects with options to renew or options to purmcli chase, is the prior enactment of a statute which is within
A~ the power of the legislature to enact, and the power of
).2u the legislature must be determined by examining the
vhal I constitutional limitations placed upon it.
this\
Even if a "public purpose" is found in the encouragement of new industry, generally, for the State of
act Utah, existence of such a public purpose does not give
and
the legislature carte blanche to pursue the public purli o! pose by unconstitutional means. Statutes enacted by it
houtl
in order to further the public purpose, as the legislature
beeu I
sees it, must nevertheless conform to the express inhibiiiri· I tions and prohibitions of the Constitutions of Utah and
wi~ I
the United States.
1ia1t

r in

I

I

For this reason, the court must consider not only
the actions taken by Tooele County and The Magne-

37

sium Project with respect to the particular bond issu
involved here, but must give consideration to the legii·
lation itself, i.e., was it within the power of this legi~·
lature to validly enact the Utah Industrial Facilitie:
Development Act. To make this determination the at''
itself must be considered as a whole. It is plaitniffa
contention that the constitutional flaws in this piece ol
legislation are so numerous that the entire act must fall.!
It is arguable, if not clear, that the unconstitutiona%[
of Section 12 alone, since it directly affects the market·'
ability of industrial development revenue bonds, woulc
be held to invalidate the entire statute. But Section I~
is only one of the flaws in the statute. As pointed out
above, it is replete with violations of express constitu. I)
tional provisions.
,.·
1

1

a
a
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Moreover, we do not concede and we do not belirn
the record shows that the development of industi}
without the establishment of legislative standards a~ tn) s
the areas in which, and the circumstances under wh1cli, \
industry will be brought into a particular count), ( s
serves any public purpose. And the facts introduced at I
the trial in this case indicate tha~ the commis~ioner: oi
Tooele County did not make an mdependent mvest~ga· r r
tion as to the total effect of The Magnesium ProJeri
on the county and the public facilities which must hi I f
maintained by it. Although employment might be in· f
creased, the evidence indicated that the county is i i 1
equipped to handle any great influx of employees, :ithtr
by way of housing, schooling, or sewage disp.osal. f~cilit I f
ties. The unemployment rate is low and it 1s <l1fficnl

!

I

!
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to justify a participation of the county in development
ii· of a private project in the absence of some local situa1~. tion which demands the development of new industry.

u1.

ie:

Issuance of industrial development revenue bonds
by municipalities and counties has some effects which
are thought by responsible opinion to be less than desirable. As pointed out in "Municipal Industrial Development Bonds," 19 Vand. L. Rev. 25 (1965) such bonds
have been officially criticized by the Investment Bankers Association of America, the Municipal Finance
Officers Association, and the Municipal Law Section of
the American Bar Association.
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It is not self-evident that industrial development in
mry area is a public benefit. As pointed out in the
Vanderbilt Law Review article, "It is a long way from
a small, depression born measure in Winona, Mississippi, to the multi-mililon dollar project in a large,
already prosperous city." To enact legislation of this
sort, the legislature should set forth the public policy
basis for authorizing bonds, if they are otherwise valid,
so that arbitrary action by municipalities and counties
may be avoided and the citizens and taxpayers, as well
as competitors of contemplated industries, might have
some assurance that the bonds are genuinely being
issued for a "public purpose" instead of in aid of a
strictly private enterprise.

~; :.1 And finally, the act must fail because it violates the
I rxpress provision of the Utah Constitution that the
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State shall not authorize any municipality or county I:
lend its credit in aid of any private enterprise.
i
The statute and the actions taken and proposed 1
be taken under it by Tooele County and The .Magnr !
sium Project should be held invalid because in contraiI
vention of the Constitutions of Utah and the Unite111
States.
Respect£ ully submitted,
11

BRYCE E. ROE
RALPH L. JERMAN
510 American Oil Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff and (
Appellant
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ADDENDUM

I

After the type was set and the brief paged. wr\
11
discovered another recent case dealing with industria 1
development bonds: Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus I_
trial Development Financing Authority, ____ N.C. · i
1
159 S.E. 2d 745 (1968). The case holds the Nortl /
Carolina bonding statute unconstitutional because not
involving a "public purpose." It also contains an excfl·
lent history of industrial development bonds and ]iii '
1
gation about them.
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